I delight in analytical discussions and sometimes wish I
could engage in them myself—but the right subject never occurs to me. The Maverick Philosopher here comes to mind;
his essays are often delightful. Sorting this I realize that some matters are
suitable for the analytical approach; others escape it. My own concerns always
stray beyond the factual regions, one of the realms where Reason is at home. I
like to read essays, for example, that try to sort bodies and souls logically—to
take a factually marginal subject, and marginal because objective data are
unavailable; but an argument concerning that subject does not fit the
analytical category very well either. It fades off into the collectively
unprovable, private, experiential sphere. One can gain interior knowledge here,
but “making a case” based on logic is impossible. And why would anyone want to?
In that context arises the generally ignored (perhaps it also resists analysis)
subject of adequacy. Why are some people seemingly constitutionally unable to
discern the transmaterial? Those who can, by contrast, do not need analytical
arguments to persuade them—although reading them might be fun. They know it in
their bones.
Reason is also comfortable in the realm of concepts. There the
factual may be ignored, but definitions rule. Given consensus on a definition,
analysis can flourish—and if the definition is contested, that only opens even
wider vistas for debate. But concepts are ultimately private labels for
clusters of more or less crystallized experience—more or less crystallized
because we constantly redefine them based on our experience. Nothing “coordinates”
or governs these redefinitions. Concepts also hold quite different ranks in the
heads of different people.
The concept of being
is a case in point for me. It plays an enormously important role in major
branches of philosophy, but shorn of any attributes beyond the bald fact of
existence, it is meaningless for me; and with attributes added, it becomes
unnecessary. Life, by contrast, is
very interesting, and in my own modes of thought has a real conceptual role to
play quite apart from specific instances where it might manifest. When I use a
word like real, the meaning ranges
way, way beyond the word’s etymological root of res, thing. The genuinely real for me is infinities beyond the
thing.
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